Cross-disciplinary Science and  the Structure of Scientific Perspectives by Alrøe, Hugo Fjelsted & Noe, Egon
Cross-disciplinary Science and 
the Structure of Scientific Perspectives 
 
HUGO FJELSTED ALRØE 
Aarhus University, Denmark 
 
EGON NOE 




Cross-disciplinary use of science is needed to solve complex, real-world problems, 
since disciplinary knowledge is insufficient. But carrying out scientific research 
with multiple very different disciplines is in itself a non-trivial problem because 
there are fundamental problems of cross-disciplinary communication, and 
because the present organization of science for cross-disciplinary work is 
inadequate. Perspectives matter. In this paper we carry out a philosophical analysis 
of the perspectival nature of science, focusing on the synchronic structure of 
scientific perspectives across disciplines and not on the diachronic, historical 
structure of shifting perspectives within single disciplines that has been widely 
discussed since Kuhn and Feyerabend. We show what kinds of cross-disciplinary 
disagreement to expect due to the perspectival structure of science, suggest how to 
handle different scientific perspectives in cross-disciplinary work through 
perspectives of a second order, and discuss some fundamental epistemic 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Perspective is one of the component parts of reality. Far from being a disturbance of its fabric, it is its 
organizing element. ... Every life is a point of view directed upon the universe. Strictly speaking, what one 
life sees no other can. ... Reality happens to be, like a landscape, possessed of an infinite number of 
perspectives, all equally veracious and authentic. The sole false perspective is that which claims to be the 
only one there is. (José Ortega y Gasset 1961 [1923], 90f) 
 
The complexity of the world is rapidly increasing, as is the complexity of science, and there is a 
continuing differentiation of functions and perspectives. Over time, science has differentiated 
from the unspecialized natural philosophy of the past into specialized fields of observation like 
biology, sociology and psychology (Stichweh 1992, 1996, Luhmann 1990, 446ff). The established 
disciplines are further differentiating into specialized sub-disciplines and new disciplines are still 
being formed based on functional professions in society like nursing and physiotherapy, and new 
technologies like information technology. Often there are also crucial differentiations within 
disciplines between different ‘schools of thought’ such as the different socioeconomic 
perspectives on globalization and sustainable development (Byrne and Glover 2002). 
 
The differentiation of science is both an answer to the growing complexity of the world and in 
itself a source of new complexity. And the growing differentiation and complexity of science is a 
challenge to the use of science in society. When society is faced with a complex problem like 
climate change, environmental pollution, sustainable food production or life style diseases, there 
is a need to draw on a range of different disciplines from physics, chemistry and physiology to 
anthropology, sociology, economics, political science and ethics, spanning natural, social and 
human sciences. But these disciplines do not agree on solutions to the problem or even on what 
the problem is. They have no shared theoretical framework, and often they disagree on essential 
questions such as what is scientific and what is good science. 
 
Therefore, there is a rising call for cross-, multi-, inter- or transdisciplinary science as a tool to 
address the combined problem of the differentiation of science and the increasing complexity of 
the systemic challenges to modern societies (e.g. Pennington 2008, Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008, Pohl 
and Hirsch Hadorn 2008). The promise is that helpful solutions can be gained from the 
(multidisciplinary) use of several disciplines on the same problem, from the (interdisciplinary) 
development of a shared framework for cooperation between the disciplines, or from a 
(transdisciplinary) integration proper of the involved disciplinary and stakeholder perspectives. 
In this paper we use the term cross-disciplinary science1 as a general term for multi-, inter- and 
transdisciplinary science, in order to be able to speak of the general problematics of cross-
disciplinary work without being caught up in the specifics of the established categories.  
 
                                                             
1 We use this term to designate (truly) cross-disciplinary research where different disciplines study the same research 
object, not including the more trivial instrumental use of other disciplines as tools within a discipline. 
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In the scientific literature there is a growing recognition that truly cross-disciplinary cooperation 
to solve complex real-world problems, which includes disciplines and schools across the 
traditional divisions between natural, social and human sciences, is very difficult to perform 
successfully. This confirms our own experiences. In spite of good wills and many ambitions to the 
contrary, there are fundamental problems in communicating and mediating between the different 
scientific perspectives, in particular where there is no common theoretical framework, and often 
the cooperation is constrained by the hegemony of one perspective at the cost of the others (e.g. 
Dewulf et al. 2007, Evely et al. 2008, Miller et al. 2008, Bracken and Oughton 2006, Harrison et al. 
2008, Pennington 2008). The more ambitious the collaboration is, in terms of using and 
integrating very different scientific perspectives in solving real, complex problems, the more 
difficult the task. This raises fundamental questions on the role of scientific knowledge, 
communication and organization in front of complex problems. Disciplinary knowledge is 
insufficient, yet there is no established cross-disciplinary knowledge to fill this gap. In this 
situation effective cross-disciplinary communication is essential to gain the most from 
disciplinary knowledge, but, as stated above, there are fundamental problems of cross-
disciplinary communication. Consequently, there is a need to re-evaluate the present organization 
of science towards complex problems. 
 
In line with the promise of transdisciplinarity, a range of different approaches to in some way  
(re-)integrate very different scientific perspectives to address complex real-world problems have 
been suggested, such as systems theory, complex modeling and various holistic frameworks. 
These efforts are commendable, but we don’t think any of them provide a general approach to 
solve the fundamental problems that arise when very different kinds of science are to be used in 
an integrated way in complex problem solving. The problems of disintegration are either ignored 
in a reductionist and hegemonic way, or a new so-called holistic perspective is introduced, which 
ignores the specialized perspectives and therefore in itself is a kind of reductionism. For instance, 
Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn (2008) consider ‘systems thinking’ a constituting conceptual basis of the 
transdisciplinary research perspective. But the choice of systems framework is not innocent – 
each system theory has its own perspective on complexity that observes certain types of 
problems, and the different system theories will leave different imprints on the answers gained. 
  
The differentiation of science, the growing complexity of the problems science is expected to 
solve, and the ensuing problems in carrying out cross-disciplinary science is not only a challenge 
to science and the use of science in society, but also a challenge to philosophy of science. Most 
work within the discipline of philosophy of science has so far been concerned with single 
disciplines, such as physics or biology. In many cases physics is used as a model for all of science. 
And even when the focus is on the heterogeneity of scientific disciplines, there is rarely any focus 
on the interplay of different disciplines (e.g. Knorr Cetina 1999, Giere 2002, Kellert et al. 2006). 
However, there is an emerging awareness of the challenge of cross-disciplinary science. Recently, 
in a discussion of the optimality approach to modeling and its dependence on other approaches, 
Potochnik (2010) concluded that there is a widely felt tension in science between the explanatory 
independence of scientific fields, subfields, approaches and research programs, and the broad, 
epistemic interdependence between them because of the inherent limitations of each approach – 
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causal complexity makes the divide-and-conquer approach to science effective for practical 
reasons; yet there is a need for collaboration: “Evidential interrelationships do not respect field 
boundaries; they require cross-disciplinary evidence-gathering” (Potochnik 2010: 230). In this 
paper we take up this challenge. 
 
We argue that the perceived problems of cross-disciplinary science are not exceptions, but 
symptoms of a fundamental structural problem in cross-disciplinary science, which can be 
analyzed philosophically by gaining a deeper understanding of the perspectival nature of science. 
The first step in the analysis is to investigate the cognitive aspects of science as a systemic learning 
process and look at the ‘instruments of observation,’ broadly construed. The differentiation of 
science is not only a differentiation of social systems, but also a cognitive and epistemic 
differentiation and specialization of scientific perspectives. Differentiation increases the 
complexity that science can handle overall, by reducing the observational complexity that each 
perspective must handle, through selection and delimitation. This makes differentiation a very 
powerful mechanism in science; and this is the reason why a genuine reintegration that 
‘undifferentiates’ scientific perspectives, in general, is neither possible nor desirable – the strength 
of independent scientific perspectives is needed. There are of course many examples of theoretical 
syntheses in science, like the neodarwinian synthesis and relativity theory, but such local 
syntheses do not negate the general processes of differentiation and the overall disunity of science 
(Kitcher 1999). Indeed, the limited reducibility of theories leads to a pluralistic epistemology of 
science with complementing truths on different cognitive levels (Rorhlich 1988). The 
differentiation of science is the reason why truly cross-disciplinary science is a non-trivial 
problem. And irrespective of metaphysical beliefs, the heterogeneity of science is an empirical fact 
for contemporary philosophy of science to address.  
 
In this paper we explore how philosophical analysis of the structure of scientific perspectives can 
help us understand the persistent problems in cross-disciplinary science. We want to expose the 
perspectival causes of communication failures and disagreements in cross-disciplinary science 
and sketch out a framework to understand and handle different scientific perspectives (see further 
in Alrøe and Noe 2014). We will start out by removing the road-block for cross-disciplinary work 
that some types of science are by necessity more scientific than others. Then we will introduce the 
concept of perspectives from a cognitive and semiotic understanding, because this contains strong 
implications for how we think about scientific knowledge and scientific disagreement. Next, we 
outline the connection between the perspectival structures of science and the types of scientific 
disagreement that they entail. Finally, we suggest how the problems that arise in cross-
disciplinary science due to the perspectival nature of science can be handled through second 
order perspectives, and outline a perspectivist typology of science to better understand 
disagreements between scientific perspectives.  
 
In doing this we hope to arouse a wider interest in the philosophy of cross-disciplinary science. 
Furthermore, the practical aspiration is that this pluralist and perspectivist, but not relativist, 
framework can serve as a helpful basis for future cross-disciplinary research and for the cross-
disciplinary use of science in society. 
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2. PERSPECTIVES, VALUES AND ‘GOOD SCIENCE’ 
Before we turn to the perspectival structures of science, we need to remove a potential road-block 
for cross-disciplinary work and for the present analysis: the idea that some types of science are 
by necessity more scientific than others, and the associated idea that the supposedly more 
scientific types of science are to be preferred to other types. A deeper analysis of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but the perspectivist understanding of science contains certain 
ideas about scientific quality that provide a more level playing field for different types of science, 
and which we will briefly outline here.  
 
The complex cross-disciplinary research processes that aim to address complex real-world 
problems are interwoven with values. Some, more traditionally inclined philosophers of science 
might therefore maintain that the problems of performing cross-disciplinary research are 
examples of a science infested with normative issues, which should have been be kept outside, 
and refuse that this is at all a problem for philosophy of science. However, it is important to 
underline that this is not a question of protecting science from outside interests and ‘social norms.’ 
The scientific perspectives that are involved in complex, social problem solving stand square 
across the normative and the empirical, across research instruments, values and social relations 
(e.g. Longino 1990). 
 
In the planning of such research, decisions must be made on what problems to investigate; what 
methods of observation and intervention to apply; which theoretical framework to utilize; which 
key concepts to use in hypothesis forming and in what sense; and what assumptions to lay down 
as a basis for model construction. Some and maybe most of these decisions are determined by 
existing research structures, traditions, policies, habits, and contingencies, but they are still 
research choices that jointly determine the specific perspective that is taken in the research 
process, and which could be different. And in a complex problem solving context, all these 
decisions harbour implicitly or explicitly value-laden choices.    
 
The realization that values are deeply embedded in the practices of sciences that address complex, 
real world problems, has important implications for how the scientific ideal of objectivity is 
construed. In the research field of sustainable food production, as an example, value-laden 
concepts such as food quality, soil quality, sustainability, animal welfare, justice, health, and 
welfare enter as key elements in most research projects. At the same time, there are diverging 
conceptions of what soil quality, animal welfare, sustainability, etc. means, both within the 
scientific community and in society at large (e.g. Schjønning et al. 2004, Fraser 1995, Byrne and 
Glover 2002). In such truly complex research fields, which include reflexive, social and semiotic 
aspects as well as causal aspects, an important requirement for doing good science is to establish 
clarity concerning how (not whether, but how) values enter into the  key value-laden concepts 
that are used and how this influences methodological choices. Apart from determining scientific 
quality, this is important for determining the relevance of the research.  
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That science is value-laden does not mean that it is necessarily subjective and bad science. On the 
contrary, the deliberate, reflexive handling of the values that are (by necessity) entailed in the 
research perspective is a precondition for doing good science. To be objective is not to be context-
free, but to be open and clear about the context and perspective from which something is stated. 
In the words of Niels Bohr, objectivity simply means giving an unambiguous description of what 
has been experienced in research, and this unambiguity can only be obtained by including the 
context of observation (Favrholdt 1999: xlix, 88-90). Bohr thus recommended “to use the word 
phenomenon only to refer to observations obtained under specified circumstances” (Favrholdt 
1999: 89) – phenomena are attached to perspectives. This is different from van Fraassen’s 
definition of phenomena as ‘observable entities’ in contrast to appearances as the (perspectival) 
outcomes of given observation or measurement set-ups, and both phenomena and appearances 
being distinct from the theoretically postulated, underlying reality (van Fraassen 2008: 283-290). 
We think a more fruitful distinction between the phenomenal and the real object can be gained 
from semiotics – see the next section. 
 
Being scientific in this sense can be expressed with the term ‘reflexive objectivity’ in line with 
other work towards a standpoint, perspectival, situated or naturalized account of objectivity (e.g. 
Kukla 2008, Barad 2007, Rouse 2002). As a criterion of good science, reflexive objectivity requires 
that the communication of scientific results must include a description of the cognitive context 
that the results spring from (Alrøe and Kristensen 2002). This is in accordance with the long 
tradition in scientific publication practices to require a description of the research method, and it 
furthermore includes other parts of the cognitive context, which are not always put forward in 
scientific publications, namely the intentional context (explicit values and problems) and the social 
context (financing and affiliations). But reflexive objectivity also points to a deeper concern for 
the cognitive context that is ‘built-into’ the scientific perspective and often not made explicit. Tacit 
values, knowledge, practices and instruments that, together with those that are made explicit in 
scientific communication, make up a scientific perspective, and they are tacit precisely because 
this is part of what makes a scientific perspective effective. In order to explore these tacit cognitive 
and perspectival structures, we need to observe scientific perspectives as perspectives and not as 
abstract theories or social groups of scientists. 
 
3. A COGNITIVE AND SEMIOTIC UNDERSTANDING OF 
SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 
There is a growing recognition that the context established by scientific disciplines, schools and 
methodological approaches is decisive for the focus and the kind of observations that can be made 
by science. This contextual and pluralist conception of science has been nurtured by the ideas 
about the incommensurability of successive scientific theories launched by Paul Feyerabend and 
Thomas Kuhn. In recent years there has been a rising interest in cognitive approaches within 
philosophy of science, where the focus is on scientific models and representation rather than 
theories and truth (e.g. Giere 1988, 1994, 2004, Cartwright 1999, van Fraassen 2008). And lately, 
Ronald Giere (2006a, 2006b) has developed this cognitive understanding of science into a 
‘scientific perspectivism’ proper. Perspectivism has had a long but marginal presence in 
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philosophy with roots in Kant and Nietzsche (e.g. Palmquist 1993, Anderson 1998). And there have 
been narrower, specific perspectivist approaches within philosophy of science, such as Rueger’s 
(2005) model-theoretical analysis of perspectives within the formalism of a theory. But Giere was 
the first to develop a fully perspectival philosophy of science. While Giere has mainly developed 
the perspectivist approach in the context of natural science, we here explore it as a general 
approach to science in its wider continental sense, which includes natural, social and human 
sciences.  
 
The perspectivist view of science is quite radical compared a conventional realist view of science, 
but it can be characterized plainly in a few sentences: There is no outside perspective on the world. 
All knowledge comes from a certain perspective. All learning happens in concrete perspectives on 
the world, which are part of the world, and which can themselves be made objects of observation. 
This fairly banal insight contains strong implications for how we think about scientific expertise, 
scientific disagreement and the role of science in society, as well as for our ideas about scientific 
norms. 
 
A scientific discipline is a specialized perspective for observation of a field with specific 
instruments, concepts, logics and examples. The perspective is reproduced and refined through 
internal processes. It delimits and focuses the field of observation, and makes possible the 
observation of certain phenomena and aspects. This view of science implies that there are many 
scientific truths about any complex problem, and that the question for philosophy of science is 
not how to select the correct one, but how to appreciate and use the nonunifiable plurality of 
partial knowledges (Longino 2006). All ontological claims are interwoven with the epistemological 
conditions for observation that apply in the perspective where it is grounded. 
 
However, this does not imply that any truth can be as good as any other, or that there is no 
difference between expertise and taste. The distinct, collective character of science is manifest in 
the foundational methodological ideas, open inquiry, systematic observation and testable truths, 
which establish its excellence in the production of knowledge. 
 
The perspectivist approach described here (which in this respect goes beyond the scientific 
perspectivism in Giere 2006a, 2006b) builds on a thoroughly semiotic understanding of a 
scientific perspective. A key element in this approach is the distinction between phenomena and 
noumena that Kant established in modern philosophy. Phenomena are things-for-us, things as 
they appear to us. Our knowledge is of phenomena and our objects reside in our phenomenal 
world. Noumena are the unknowable things-in-themselves. Scholars have long disagreed on this 
distinction between phenomena and noumena, but as Palmquist (1993, App. VIII) argues, Kant's 
distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal realms is properly regarded as a 
perspectival distinction. The noumenal is not found as an object of experience, but only by its 
possible effect.  
 
In Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics we find the same distinction in an elaborated theory of 
representation and interpretation, which is readily applied in a perspectivist view of science. 
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According to Peirce: “A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity” (Nöth 1990: 42, CP: 2.228 [1897]). In his later works he 
stresses the semiotic relation between the immediate object that is represented in the sign and the 
reality of the object:   
 
“I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined by an Object and on the other hand 
so determines an idea in a person’s mind2, that this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant 
of the Sign is thereby mediately determined by that Object. A Sign therefore has a triadic relation to its 
Object and to its Interpretant. But it is necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as 
the Sign represents it, from the Dynamical Object, or really efficient but not immediately present Object.” 
(Peirce 1998: 482, CP: 8.343 [1908])  
 
Peirce’s theory of semiotics is very rich, but here it suffices to point out that three analytically 
distinctive but practically connected operations are performed within a semiotic process. One is 
the selection of an immediate object from the redundancy of possibilities pertaining to the 
dynamical object; the second is the assigning of a sign to the immediate object, which represents 
the object in an iconic (similarity), indexical (direct connection) or symbolic (conventional) way; 
and the third is the linking of the quality of the immediate object (regarding its reference to the 
dynamical object) with its pragmatic use in the interpretation.  
 
It is important to stress that, in Peirce’s sense, there is no position from where we can observe the 
dynamical object as such; every perspective only adds to the number of immediate objects that 
refer to the dynamical object. This is of course very different from a traditional realist conception 
which takes the thing in itself as the immediately present object. Furthermore, there is no 
ontological commitment to objects in favour of relations implied in the term “object”. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the fundamental elements of scientific observation in form of a semiotic model 
of the cognitive aspects of a scientific perspective , which builds on Peirce’s theory of semiotics 
and the semiotic approach to cognition as a coupling of interaction and reference in the 
biosemiotic tradition (e.g. Uexküll 1982, Hoffmeyer 1997), and in this way follows Kukla’s (1992) 
definition of a cognitive system as an interpreter; and on Niels Bohr’s epistemological lesson from 
quantum physics, which he stated in many places, here from a letter to Pascual Jordan in 1931: “Not 
only, of course, have we learnt that every observation involves a disturbance of the phenomena; 
we have furthermore realized that the whole concept of observation requires a separation 
between the object and the means of observation” (Favrholdt 1999: 521), and which has later been 
taken up by Barad (2007: e.g. 148) and Rouse (2002: 272ff).  
 
                                                             
2 This is a pedagogical presentation. Peirce did in fact not restrict interpretants to persons (Peirce 1998: 478). 
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Figure 1: A semiotic model of the cognitive aspects of a scientific perspective observing a dynamical object, which is 
represented by an immediate object within the perspective, and the three key conditions for observation:  
delimitation, representation and interaction. 
 
The model shows the three key conditions for observation. System delimitation: the very idea of 
observation requires a delimitation of the cognitive system, which separates the observer and the 
observed. Semiotic representation: the cognitive complexity of the observing system enables, and 
delimits, the complexity of the ‘observer world.’ Causal interaction: observation requires an 
interaction between the observer and the observed that can irritate the representation, and which 
connects the observer and the observed in a shared reference frame. A scientific observation is 
always done from a certain perspective with certain concepts, theories, models, examples, 
problems and instruments that establish the three conditions for observation. The communicative 
aspects of the scientific perspective are not shown explicitly in the figure but the semiotic model 
shows the sign as a link to the deeper cognitive basis for scientific communication – the sign is “a 
Medium for the communication of a Form”, as Peirce puts it3. 
 
As a simple example of the three conditions for observation, consider a blind man with a stick. 
Holding the stick firmly, the man is able to observe the floor in front of him by moving the stick 
around, but he cannot observe the stick – the stick is part of the observing system. Holding the 
stick loosely, the man can observe the form of the stick in his hand, but not the floor in front of 
him – the stick is now part of what he observes. He can delimit his observing system to his hand 
or he can include the stick, but he cannot do both at the same time; he needs to make a separation 
between the observing and the observed to observe at all. If there is no interaction, if the stick just 
waves around in empty space, there can be no observation. But if the stick hits something, a 
dynamical object, this causal interaction is an irritation that will enable him to start making a 
semiotic representation of the space around him. Both the interaction and the representation are 
necessary for his process of observation. At first the representation may be crude and not very 
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helpful, but with continued interaction it may be refined and become more useful, so that he can 
use his observations to act in his environment.   
 
The representations of science refer to or point at dynamical objects, and the representations are 
tested when we establish observational situations (systematic observations, interventions, 
experiments) where the dynamical objects may ‘kick back’ in the causal interactions that are an 
essential part of observations (cf. Figure 1), but the dynamical objects can never be fully captured 
in the immediate objects of science. A dynamical object has a surplus of possibilities for 
observation, and the representation in form of an immediate object present in any observation is, 
by necessity, a reduction based on a certain perspective.  
 
When two different observations of the same dynamical object mutually exclude each other, we 
end up with ‘complementary phenomena’ in Bohr’s sense (Favrholdt 1999: 88-90). Quantum 
physical complementarity arises where the necessary interaction with the observed object (cf. 
Figure 1) cannot be disregarded, because the observed objects are sufficiently small that the 
quantum of action becomes significant. Popularly speaking, the position of a particle cannot be 
observed without the radiation involved in the observation influencing the momentum or the 
particle, and therefore measuring the position will make the momentum indeterminate or ill 
defined, and vice versa. Some twenty years after Bohr first presented his complementarity view, 
he emphasized “the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects 
and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under 
which the phenomena appear. …  Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental 
conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as 
complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible 
information about the objects” (Bohr 1949). This nicely sums up the analogy between quantum 
physical complementarity and the potentially complementary relations between different 
scientific perspectives in cross-disciplinary science.   
 
By definition, it is a condition for cross-disciplinary science proper that the different perspectives 
observe the same thing, so to say, and here the model in Figure 1 points to a two-layered problem 
of communication across scientific perspectives. There is a need to point directly at some ‘real’ 
dynamical object to be shared in cross-disciplinary work, but we can only communicate signs 
(names, models, etc.).4 The specialized languages of scientific disciplines and schools are not 
generally shared. Some perspectives are closely connected and share methods, models, theories 
or worldviews, others are very different and closed to each other. The ‘rock bottom’ basis for 
cross-perspectival communication is the ‘common, ordinary language’ (in Bohr’s sense, see 
                                                             
4 According to Weisberg’s (2007) argument that modeling is the analysis of real-world phenomena by way of analysing a 
model, these two signs, names and models, would be quite different forms of signs, a name being an abstract direct 
representation and a model being an indirect representation. Translating this understanding into the Peircean semiotic 
terminology, a model is a dynamical object that is constructed to represent another (real-world) dynamical object. Hence, 
whereas a model is a (quite complex) iconic sign in itself, we would more often communicate signs based on observations 
of that sign, or descriptions of models, in Weisberg’s words. 
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Favrholdt 1999: xxxvii), though this is still conditioned on common daily lives and therefore prone 
to cultural differences.  
 
To take a simple example, the common name ‘a cow’ can be generally shared but reveals fairly 
little of the dynamical object referred to. More specialized, perspectival names such as dairy cow 
(for production), year cow (for accounting), prize animal (for cattle shows), livestock unit (risk of 
eutrophication) and grazing pressure (for landscape conservation) point to different aspects of the 
dynamical object of a cow. In order to successfully communicate the immediate objects 
represented by these names across perspectives, a shared interpretation of the sign has to be 
established. Communicating across perspectives is not a trivial thing.  
 
The second layer of the problem is that the same dynamical object can be observed and 
represented in different ways in different perspectives, but none of these immediate objects is the 
same as the dynamical object in itself, and it is not possible a priori to determine whether different 
scientific perspectives observe the same dynamical object in cross-disciplinary work, even 
though this is the presumed. In language terms, when one perspective speaks of ‘sustainable 
development,’ ‘soil quality,’ ‘farm,’ or ‘cow,’ it does not necessarily mean the same as when another 
perspective uses the same term. The communicative paradox of cross-disciplinary science is that 
the common language is not sufficiently precise to handle the immediate objects of specialized 
perspectives, but more precise and specialized communication moves us away from the common 
language with which we can communicate across perspectives. This is a lesson to be learned from 
Peirce’s semiotics, and an idea that has been radicalized by Niklas Luhmann (1995, 143, emphasis 
in original): “The fact that understanding is an indispensable feature in how communication 
comes about has far-reaching significance for comprehending communication. One consequence 
is that communication is possible only as a self-referential process.” Communication across 
perspectives depends on structural couplings being established, and the differentiation and 
specialization of scientific perspectives reinforces this key condition. 
 
We may be able to interact with the dynamical object through experiments, which create 
particular observation conditions, and through practical experiences, and in this way we can 
attempt to establish whether our representations ‘correspond’ to reality. But built into the 
observation conditions provided by different scientific perspectives, there is a linkage between 
ways of interacting with the world and ways of representing the world that makes it difficult, and 
in principle impossible, to share a common reference to a dynamical object across perspectives. 
Obviously, this does not mean that one cannot perform cross-disciplinary work, but it does mean 
that cross-disciplinary work is not a trivial matter. In the following sections we will explore the 
perspectival structure of cross-disciplinary science and offer some perspectivist analyses and 
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4. THE PERSPECTIVAL STRUCTURE OF CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY SCIENCE 
The perspectivist conception of science presents a fruitful route to a better understanding of the 
problems and potential of cross-disciplinary work. A key step is to give an outline of the 
connection between perspectival structures of science and the types of scientific disagreement 
that they entail. Scientific disagreement is a good thing. It is through disagreements that scientific 
knowledge is  tested and developed. But the confusion of different kinds of scientific disagreement 
is not productive. By creating a better overview of what kinds of disagreement can be expected 
between different scientific perspectives, due to their perspectival differences, we can establish a 
better basis for assessing and handling other forms of scientific disagreement, which are due to 
scientific dishonesty, political spin, disciplinary hegemony, bad science, etc., and point out a route 
to overcome some of the pitfalls of cross-disciplinary research.  
 
The differences between types of scientific knowledge, disagreement and learning that appear in 
a perspectivist understanding of science are shown in Table 1. The table shows different types of 
knowledge, disagreement and learning (columns) in relation to the perspectival structure of 
science (rows indicating ‘within a perspective’, ‘between perspectives’, etc.).  The kinds of 
disagreement to expect within a perspective are the normal, converging disagreements (Table 1, 
row 1) and the diverging disagreements that transgress the perspective and which may transform 
or split up the perspective (Table 1, row 2), whereas forms of unconnected ‘blind’ disagreements 
and communication failures are to expected between different perspectives (Table 1: row 3). Most 
elements in the perspectivist understanding of science shown in Table 1 have been treated in other 
contexts, without a comprehensive perspectival framework, and the table shows a few well 
known philosophical and sociological approaches, such as the boundary-work of Thomas Gieryn, 
the scientific revolutions of Thomas Kuhn, and Harry Collins’ interactional expertise. 
 
 Type of knowledge and 
expertise 
Type of disagreement Type of system 
learning process  






































4. In a second order 
perspective 








Table 1. Types of knowledge, disagreement and learning in relation to the perspectival structure of science. 
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Gieryn (1983) investigates the actual delimitations of science from non-science that specific 
sciences use in the pursuit of their professional goals. As discussed in a previous section, such 
boundary-work can be a problem in cross-disciplinary work, because some scientific 
perspectives are marginalized as non-scientific by other, more esteemed and powerful 
perspectives. See e.g. Hinrichs (2008) for a discussion of boundary work in agrifood studies. 
 
Kuhn’s paradigms are examples of perspectives in our understanding. Kuhn (1996 [1969]), in his 
Postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, suggests the term ‘disciplinary matrix’ as a 
more precise term for ‘paradigm,’ the term used in his highly influential book from 1962. The 
disciplinary matrix includes symbolic generalizations (theories and laws), metaphysical 
paradigms (models, analogies, and metaphors), values, and exemplars (concrete problem-
solutions). The elements of Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix are similar to the elements of what we have 
termed the cognitive context of a scientific perspective. However, Kuhn and the rich tradition 
following Kuhn have a historical, diachronic focus, where the paradigms of normal science are 
interrupted by scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts within a certain scientific field, whereas 
we in this paper focus on the synchronic disagreements between different perspectives and the 
consequences of the historical differentiation of science into different fields, disciplines and 
schools, in line with Maruyama (1974). The Kuhnian tradition in general focuses on theories and 
language, though there are some who take a more cognitive approach (Chen 1997, Andersen et al. 
2006). Our approach here differs from the main tradition in having an explicit cognitive focus on 
what can broadly be called ‘the observational apparatus.’  Kuhn’s views on the 
incommensurability between consecutive paradigms correspond to the problems in integrating 
and communicating across perspectives in cross-disciplinary work that we have described in this 
paper. But where Kuhn uses a language metaphor, talking of the untranslatability between 
different paradigms (Chen 1997), our approach points out that is in principle impossible and in 
practice more or less difficult to communicate across perspectives because each observational 
perspective has its own phenomenal world – its own representation of the world entailed in 
theories, models, concepts and examples, which is tied into the specific observational apparatus 
and the specific forms of interaction provided by it. Despite the common features, our more 
general (not only diachronic, but also synchronic) and explicitly perspectivist approach leads to 
other questions and other answers than Kuhn’s. 
 
Collins and following him a number of other researchers have investigated what the scientific 
practice means for expertise, and what scientific disagreement means for the role that expertise 
has in society (e.g. Collins 2004, Collins and Evans 2007). However, this work concerns in 
particular the opportunities for individual researchers to obtain expertise in a different field than 
their own, and not the general perspectival structures that are in focus here. Collins distinguishes 
between contributory expertise, possessed by those who participate in everyday activities and 
development of the field, and interactional expertise, which is characteristic of those who can 
communicate fully with the field, but are not able to contribute. The general interactional expertise 
of scientists (especially within the natural sciences) helps make the, in principle impossible, cross-
disciplinary cooperation merely difficult. But in general, it takes a long time to obtain interactional 
expertise on a new field, and due to the differentiation and specialization of science it is hardly 
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possible today to become a ‘modern renaissance man’ with interactional expertise in a range of 
widely different fields. Interactional expertise therefore cannot be considered a general solution 
to the cross-disciplinary conundrum. The ‘trading zones’ of Galison (1997: 803ff) refer to scientific 
communities and not individuals, but still, the focus is on language and not on scientific 
perspectives as a whole.  
 
The perspectivist understanding provides a common framework for discussing these different 
approaches to handling knowledge, disagreement and learning across scientific perspectives, and 
this linkage may be helpful in itself. But the really novel in the perspectivist approach is that it 
points to structures beyond these existing approaches. It is only in a thoroughly perspectivist 
understanding of science that the possibility of a fourth, multi-perspectival form of knowledge, 
disagreement and learning shows up, building on the idea of second order cybernetics (Foerster 
1984). Perspectival disagreement and reflexive expertise are based on the handling of contextual 
knowledge from first order perspectives in a second order learning process, which we call 
polyocular communication (Table 1: row 4). . This involves a second order perspective that 
observes the observations of first order perspectives.  
 
In the next two sections we first describe how second order perspectives can be used concretely 
to handle cross-disciplinary science and then outline some general cognitive and epistemic 
structures of scientific perspectives that can help facilitate such processes.  
 
5. SECOND ORDER OBSERVATION OF SCIENTIFIC 
PERSPECTIVES IN CROSS-DISCIPLINARY SCIENCE 
Building on the ideas in the previous section, we suggest that the problems that arise in cross-
disciplinary science due to the perspectival nature of science need to be handled through 
perspectives of a second order. Using a term first used by Magoroh Maruyama (1974, 1978, 2004) 
in cross-cultural and organization studies, we characterize such second order learning processes 
as polyocular communication based on second order observations. That is, a second order 
perspective does not directly observe the research object; it performs second order observations 
of the first order scientific perspectives observing the object, and in this sense it manifests one 
multi-perspectival or polyocular view of the object (see Figure 2 for an example).  
 
The need for second order perspectives and polyocular communication is a reaction to the 
difficulties of communicating directly across different perspectives with, possibly, different 
immediate objects in form of theories, models, taxonomies and entities, different delimitations of 
the shared (dynamical) research object, different understandings of common concepts, different 
logics and rationales, different criteria of science and different societal and intentional contexts in 
form of values and interests. The subject matter of the polyocular communication is thus 
contextualised observations and representations that expose the perspectives and conditions they 
stem from, and contextualised notions of knowledge and expertise in general. The second order 
perspective that is home to polyocular communication is on the one hand a scientific perspective 
like any other, residing in a research group or a wider research community, but different in 
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operating at a meta-level compared to first order scientific perspectives on the research object. As 
such it is a different form of organization of the research process, a research process that includes 
two levels of observation to enable a new form of knowledge production based on polyocular 
communication. 
 
In the (obviously simplified) example in Figure 2, agronomy is concerned with food production 
and observes yields on the farm, biology is concerned with nature and observes biodiversity in 
and off the fields, economy is concerned with markets and observes commodities from the 
enterprise, and sociology is concerned with culture and observes human interactions in and 
around the farm. In a concrete cross-disciplinary investigation of, say, nature quality in a farmed 
landscape, these disciplinary perspectives represent different interests in nature quality with very 
different ideas about what nature quality means, they have different methods for how nature 
quality is best investigated, different geographical and conceptual boundaries of farms and 
landscapes, and in the end they draw different conclusions based on different rationales. A 
common geographical research area therefore cannot ensure that the different perspectives 
observe the same dynamical object, and a common pool of data cannot ensure integration across 
disciplines, since data are always observations from a certain scientific perspective. 
 
It is sometimes stated as a goal that the scientific disciplines that are applied in cross-disciplinary 
research should undergo a disciplinary integration proper, often using the term transdisciplinary 
science (e.g. Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn 2008). This may be a relevant target if the objective is, for 
instance, to create an integrated perspective on a technological field such as nanotechnology 
(Johnson 2009). If the integration succeeds, a new, separate perspective is established, where 
specific theories, models, values, logic and exemplars are selected and the research field 
determined. There are strong internal mechanisms in science that favour the formation of 
specialized perspectives, which offer consistent, effective and accurate knowledge in the context 
of their particular, delimited research world and refined tools of observation.  
 
On the other hand, the idea of transdisciplinarity of a first order, without the selections and 
delimitations inherent in the formation of a single scientific perspective, is incongruous. The 
specialized disciplines are generally not able to both reproduce and refine their own perspective 
and carry out second order observations of the different perspectives (including their own) that 
are employed in cross-disciplinary work. It is fine to utilize and extend the interactional expertise, 
in Collins’ sense, that each researcher bring into the work, but while such individual cross-cutting 
expertise is helpful, it is not enough to underpin cross-disciplinary work. There is a need for 
formalized procedures to observe and communicate about the scientific perspectives involved, 
and there is a need for separate resources to perform such second order learning processes in 
scientific practice, as illustrated in Figure 2. Concretely, this could for instance be organized in 
form of a separate work package in a cross-disciplinary research project, with its own funding 
and human resources, but also involving researchers from the different disciplinary perspectives, 
with the aim to establish a reflexive, polyocular communication based on observations of the 
observations of different disciplinary perspectives and their cognitive context.  
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Figure 2: An example of polyocular communication based on second order observations  
of specialized disciplinary perspectives on a farm enterprise. 
 
In conclusion, the polyocular approach to cross-disciplinary work that we have outlined here is 
neither a dis-integrated multidisciplinary approach, even though it does not seek to integrate the 
different disciplines involved, nor a formation of a new, integrated scientific perspective as an 
independent approach or discipline, even though it does bring a form of integration. This is not to 
say that polyocular observation and communication cannot lead to new and more integrated 
models of the research object, or that the involved scientific perspectives cannot learn from the 
process and transform their own approach accordingly. And indeed, such second order learning 
processes are bound to promote interactional expertise among the involved researchers. But the 
successful application of a polyocular approach does not depend on such changes. In fact, the 
approach depends on clear and distinct perspectives where the conditions for observation can be 
unambiguously described; and we must expect it to sometimes bring forth mutually excluding 
representations of the research object from different perspectives, or complementary phenomena 
in Bohr’s sense.    
 
Broadening the scope, we think there is a need for such second order observations, polyocular 
learning processes and reflexive expertise on cross-disciplinary work not only to handle the 
internal problems of the practice of cross-disciplinary research, but wherever different strands 
of science are used together to help solve complex problems and whenever different specialized 
scientific perspectives are brought in as expertise in democratic debates and societal decisions. 
 
A farm enterprise
Observations of disciplinary perspectives
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6. FUNDAMENTAL EPISTEMIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES  
Establishing second order perspectives on cross-disciplinary science is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for a productive understanding of perspectival disagreements. There is a need 
for an overview of how different scientific perspectives differ in epistemically relevant ways and 
what this means for their function. There are many possible ways to structure and categorize 
different types of science, and many have been suggested over time, but the perspectivist view of 
science that we apply here implies a different typology of science than the conventional.  
 
Traditionally, science has been seen as divided into two or three main types, with the natural 
sciences on one side and the social and human sciences on the other, based on an ontological 
distinction between human and nature as that which is ‘not human’. We don’t think these 
traditional divisions, which are widely embedded in university structures and public perceptions, 
reflect the really fundamental differences between scientific perspectives very well. From a 
perspectivist viewpoint, differences that are based on the epistemological and methodological 
relation between the scientific perspective and its research world are more fundamental, and a 
better ‘map’ of these fundamental structures will provide a better basis for multiperspectival 
communication and cooperation. Below we briefly describe three basic distinctions between 
types of scientific perspectives (see also Alrøe and Kristensen 2002).  
 
The first really fundamental distinction, following Habermas (1972, 302-310) is between different 
cognitive interests of science and the associated methodological differences. We do not follow 
Habermas’ original triadic distinction, which somewhat mimics the traditional distinction 
between natural, human and social sciences. We distinguish between an empirical interest that 
produces descriptive and predictive knowledge referring to how the world is and probably will 
be and a normative interest that produces prescriptive knowledge on how the world should be 
and ideas about the good.  The methodological distinctions based on cognitive interests carve the 
world of science differently than the traditional divisions: typical empirical sciences are physics, 
biology and most social sciences, typical normative sciences are logics, aesthetics and ethics. 
Following Peirce (1998: 51, 259), a third form of science is the hypothetical sciences, with a 
hypothetical interest in producing possible world structures. The hypothetical sciences include 
mathematics (the archetype of this form of science), counterfactual history, counterfactual 
modeling, scenario analysis, etc. Empirical, normative and hypothetical perspectives are all crucial 
and equally qualified ingredients in cross-disciplinary science targeted at complex real-world 
problems and social development.  
 
The second fundamental methodological distinction is between reductive science focusing on 
parts and processes and systems science focusing on whole systems. This is the difference, in 
degree, between scientific perspectives with less reduced, real-world-like research worlds and 
perspectives with more reduced, laboratory-like research worlds (see Rouse 1987, 101). It generally 
distinguishes physics from ecology and social science, but the methodological distinction does not 
follow traditional disciplinary borders since there are more or less reductive perspectives within 
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physics, ecology and social science. Both reductive science and systems science relies on 
idealization in their theory building, but reductive science furthermore relies on the practical 
construction of observationally delimiting experiments (or thought experiments) and theoretical 
abstraction from complex system contexts.  
 
There are great scientific advantages of working with highly reduced research worlds in terms of 
possibilities for experimental control and replication of results and accompanying powers of 
precision and generalization. This has often led to the, more or less explicit, conception that the 
systems sciences are necessarily less scientific than reductive sciences. But there are both benefits 
and costs of reduction: the powers of generalization come at the cost of impotence outside the 
constraining presumptions of the reduced research world. Faced with social phenomena, the laws 
of physics have only a limited power of explanation. One form of hegemony in cross-disciplinary 
science is thus the presumed superiority of reductive science over systems science, leading to the 
neglect of ‘systems effects’, ‘emergent properties’, ‘the management factor’, ‘the role of motivation’, 
etc. Conversely, there are methodological limits to systems science due to the heterogeneity of the 
more complex research entities, resulting in limited predictive powers. Furthermore there are 
ethical concerns due to the direct involvement in complex social and ecological systems, which 
the more reductive sciences are able to bracket out (but not avoid). 
 
The third and last fundamental methodological distinction that we emphasize here is between 
detached and involved sciences. This is the less advertised difference between two positions of 
science in relation to its research world, the detached, observational and descriptive stance and 
the involved, experimental and intervening stance, in line with a pragmatist view of science. Some 
sciences, like astronomy, cosmology and the museum-based natural history of the past, are almost 
fully detached from their research object (this distinction does not concern the relation of science 
to its immediate objects, representations or models, but the relation to the dynamical research 
object). But most modern sciences are ‘systemic sciences’ that, in some way or another, influence 
the object that they study – if not directly through their scientific practices, then through the larger 
circles of research use. High energy physics constructs its elementary particles in giant colliders, 
chemistry invents new fancy molecules, conservation science conserves fragile ecosystems, 
health science cures diseases, anthropology brings new ideas into hitherto isolated cultures, and 
psychology changes the way people think about themselves. The mix and sequence of detached 
and involved stances is a key element in all scientific practice, in reductive as well as systems 
sciences. The detachment from the research object is a hallmark of science, as indicated by the 
importance of the conventional concept of objectivity, but this is only a conditional independence 
– conditional on the choices and actions needed to establish a detached stance.  
 
The three fundamental distinctions can be used as dimensions to ‘map’ different kinds of scientific 
perspectives into a new typology of science. In the empirical sciences the map will include 
classificatory (detached, reductive), experimental (involved, reductive), historical (detached, 
systems), and developmental sciences (involved, systems). The classificatory and experimental 
approaches in the reductive sciences are closely connected, such as for instance the particle 
classifications and experiments of high energy physics, whereas the historical and developmental 
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perspectives in systems sciences are as different from each other as they are from very reductive 
sciences. We have experienced this marked but often unacknowledged difference between a 
detached, descriptive systems perspective and an involved, systems perspective that is oriented 
towards instigating change and transition, as a source of frustrating and unexplained 
disagreements in cross-disciplinary research.  
 
A typology of science that is based on fundamental epistemic differences can facilitate the 
initiation and planning of cross-disciplinary research projects by offering recognition of very 
different types of science as equals, and by providing a place and function for different types of 
scientific perspectives. The specific differences can also be of help in the polyocular 
communication processes that we suggested above for cross-disciplinary science. For instance, 
logic may be recognized as a normative science that in this respect resembles aesthetics and ethics 
more than it does the hypothetical science of pure mathematics or the empirical science of 
physics; economics may be recognized as a relatively reductive science, which in this respect 
resembles physics more than it resembles other, less reductive social sciences; and conservation 
biology may be recognized as an involved science that resembles social management sciences 
more than the detached, descriptive science of natural history. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
Science is differentiated and heterogeneous, and there is a need for different kinds of science to 
come together to help solve the complex problems of modern society. But cross-disciplinary 
science is not a trivial matter, and often the scientific communication across disciplines proves 
difficult and inadequate.  This is not, in general, due to some kinds of science being more scientific 
than others. Empirical and normative research, reductive and systems research, involved and 
detached research can all be equally good science in a sufficiently general conception of science. 
We have argued that an increased awareness of the perspectival structure of science can facilitate 
scientific progress in the cross-disciplinary practice and use of science. To this end, we have 
pointed out the need for a new form of organizing science that includes separate, second order 
research processes that allow for polyocular observation and communication of specialized 
scientific perspectives, and sketched out how they can be realized. Making clear what perspectival 
disagreements to expect in cross-disciplinary science can help distinguish sound and productive 
scientific disagreements from disagreements due to bad science, dishonesty, spin and disciplinary 
hegemony, and thus help enable a new perspectivist approach to scientific knowledge. This paper 
is only onestep towards a philosophically and practically satisfying perspectivist framework for 
cross-disciplinary science, but we hope that it may lead to more philosophical, scientific and 
practical interest in the differences between scientific perspectives and what this means for the 
ability of science to investigate and help solve complex, real-world problems. 
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